b) categories of sustainability agreements that require evaluation. Policymakers say the evaluation of sustainable development initiatives should also take into account the “benefits to society as a whole.” Thus, not just consumers who buy the product of concern from the sustainable development initiative. What exactly is the CMA`s view? In the monitoring guidelines, the Minister refers, among other things, to sustainability agreements, which are widely accepted, among other things, by “citizens` and business representatives.” This seems consistent with sustainable development policy. Recalling that an appropriate part of the sustainable development initiative must benefit consumers, the CMA considers in its decision tree “the consumer group as a whole”. However, it is not clear which consumers the CMA refers to. The European Commission takes note of the public consultation launched on 9 July 2020 by the Dutch Competition Authority (ACM) on its revised draft guidelines on sustainable development agreements. The Commission fully supports the need for clear guidelines for agreements to reduce greenhouse gas emissions compatible with competition law. The CMA has formulated the following three guidelines for monitoring sustainable development agreements: it is clear that ACM is taking a progressive approach that will influence the wider debate in the EU and around the world on the application of competition law to cooperation for sustainable development.  Draft guidelines could therefore examine the circumstances in which sustainability agreements do not have anti-competitive effects. The only standard available is “non-perceptible” competition, which indicates de minimis communication and its market share of up to 10%. However, this threshold is low for agreements that do not have positive effects, unlike sustainable development agreements.
The draft guidelines set a market share of less than 30% for the quantification of services in order to facilitate the exemption of small sustainable development initiatives under Article 101, paragraph 3 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union, but market shares have no impact on whether consumers benefit from them or complicate or facilitate this calculation. Rather, this 30% market share could be seen as an indication that sustainable development agreements do not have anti-competitive effects (as used in category exemption regulations). Within the proposed framework, the CMA intends to expand the scope of the equitable sharing test for certain types of sustainability agreements. 2. The explicit authorisation of contacts and the exchange of information on sustainable development agreements and do not exclude exclusion from exclusion. Future guidelines could therefore make a decisive contribution to Wouters` interpretation. This applies without prejudice to the assessment of the willingness to pay under Article 101, paragraph 3, of the TFUE, for agreements designed to meet consumer demand as long as all other sustainability agreements are considered against Wouters, including qualitative benefits and compensation for environmental damage. Had this been done for Chicken of Tomorrow, proportionality would have been competing for higher animal welfare standards, while earlier reaching the current minimum conditions.